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Abstract. Open-ended evolutionary dynamics remains an elusive goal
for artificial evolutionary systems. Many ideas exist in the biological liter-
ature beyond the basic Darwinian requirements of variation, differential
reproduction and inheritance. I argue that these ideas can be seen as
aspects of five fundamental requirements for open-ended evolution: (1)
robustly reproductive individuals, (2) a medium allowing the possible
existence of a practically unlimited diversity of individuals and interac-
tions, (3) individuals capable of producing more complex offspring, (4)
mutational pathways to other viable individuals, and (5) drive for con-
tinued evolution. I briefly discuss implications of this view for the design
of artificial systems with greater evolutionary potential.
1 Introduction
If there is one lesson to be learned from the first 60 years of research into the
evolution of digital organisms, it is that the classic Darwinian ingredients of vari-
ation, differential reproduction and inheritance are not, in themselves, sufficient
for producing open-ended dynamics in which new, surprising, and sometimes
more complex organisms continue to appear (Taylor et al., 2014).1
Most evolutionary artificial life systems tend to rather quickly reach a quasi-
stable state beyond which no qualitatively new innovations are seen to appear
(Taylor, 2013). None has displayed dynamics which might be regarded as the
holy grail of artificial life, where the continued evolution of novel forms is so
interesting that the researcher is unwilling to press the “off” switch.
Various artificial life researchers have started to look at different aspects of
the biological world for the missing ingredients. At the same time, our under-
standing of processes important in biological evolution has been greatly supple-
mented by new research in many areas, including epigenetics (Jablonka et al.,
2005), non-coding regions of DNA (Comfort, 2015), neutral evolutionary net-
works (Wagner, 2011), facilitated variation (Gerhart and Kirschner, 2007), niche
construction (Odling-Smee et al., 2003), and others.
1 In this paper I will use an informal definition of open-ended evolution as “evolu-
tionary dynamics in which new, surprising, and sometimes more complex organisms
continue to appear.”
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While these new research directions are exciting and promise new insights
into the important ingredients of biological evolution, the underlying simplicity
of the Darwinian picture of variation, differential reproduction and inheritance
soon disappears in the panoply of new ideas. Of course, that might just be the
price we have to pay for a deeper understanding of evolution—biology, unlike
the physical sciences, is an historically contingent subject that can be fiercely
resistant to Occam’s razor. On the other hand, it may be that these new ideas
are all jigsaw pieces of a still simple, if somewhat expanded, framework in which
we can understand biological evolution.
In the following section, I suggest that there are five fundamental require-
ments for a system to exhibit open-ended evolution. I show how the various ideas
mentioned above fit into this picture, discuss how they relate to past work in
artificial life, and suggest various directions that are indicated for future research.
2 Requirements
At a very general level, the following five features are necessary, and I claim
sufficient, for a system to exhibit open-ended evolutionary dynamics:2
– Robustly reproductive individuals.
– A medium allowing the possible existence of a practically unlimited diversity
of individuals and interactions, at various levels of complexity.
– Individuals capable of producing more complex offspring.
– An evolutionary search space which typically offers mutational pathways
from one viable individual to other viable (and potentially fitter) individuals.
– Drive for continued evolution.
Each of these features is discussed below.
2.1 Robustly reproductive individuals
The basic components of any evolutionary system are individual entities that can
catalyse the production of (sometimes imperfect) copies of themselves. Successful
individuals must be robust enough to survive in their environment until they have
performed at least one reproduction. In order for an evolutionary process to be
sustained, there must be at least some such robustly reproducing individuals in
the population.3
While this may appear to be a fairly basic statement, the question of what are
the appropriate ways to achieve robustness in artificial life systems has not often
received the attention it deserves. Von Neumann’s self-reproducing automata
2 This list is a refinement of the ideas presented in (Taylor, 2012).
3 Note that this requirement relates to the robustness of an individual to survive in
its (potentially variable) environment. A separate consideration is the robustness of
a population of individuals to cope with changing environments over evolutionary
timescales; such population robustness is addressed in Section 2.4.
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(von Neumann, 1966), and other systems of self-reproduction in 2D cellular au-
tomata, are generally not robust: they do not engage in self-maintenance and
self-repair, and are susceptible to disruptive perturbations from neighbouring
individuals. Hence, while these systems might possess some desirable theoret-
ical evolutionary capacity (see Section 2.3), in practice they are evolutionary
non-starters.
Digital organism systems such as Tierra and Avida hard-wire robustness into
the system by not granting individuals write-access to other parts of memory
(except in the special case where some new memory has been allocated for re-
production). This was a critical design decision that allowed prolonged evolution
to happen in these systems, in contrast to predecessors such as Core War, where
individuals could overwrite each other with no such restrictions (Ray, 1991).
However, by hard-wiring write protection into the system, programs in Tierra
and Avida become relatively isolated from each other, with consequences for
what kinds of interactions are possible.4
Biological organisms need to actively maintain their organisation against
the disruptive pull of the second law of thermodynamics. Concerns of entropy
increase are not immediately applicable to digital organisms, unless entropy is
intentionally built into the digital physics of the system.5 If entropy was built
into an artificial life system, it would mean that the digital organisms would
have to concern themselves with self-maintenance, and that most structures
would naturally decay without the need for arbitrary mechanisms like reaper
queues. This would entail the organisation of digital organisms more closely
corresponding to the characterisation of living organisation as self-building, self-
maintaining and self-reproducing systems, e.g. (Varela et al., 1974; Rosen, 1991;
Ga´nti et al., 2003).
An significant open question for artificial life research is understanding the
importance of topics such as entropy and self-maintenance for open-ended evo-
lution.
2.2 A medium allowing the possible existence of a practically
unlimited diversity of individuals and interactions, at various
levels of complexity
A clear requirement for open-ended evolution is that many different types of
organism must be conceivable within the system. The medium in which the evo-
lutionary process is unfolding must allow the possibility of a practically unlimited
diversity of organism organisations, processes and interactions.
Much previous work within artificial life has concentrated on the ability of
organisms to evolve complex computational and information processing capabil-
ities, such as the ability of digital organisms in Avida to solve logic functions
4 This therefore also has consequences for the degree of drive for continued evolution
(see Section 2.5).
5 Although note that in some physically-inspired models of computation such as con-
servative logic, there are more clearly defined analogies of heat dissipation and en-
tropy (Fredkin and Toffoli, 1982).
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(Lenski et al., 2003) or the evolution of complex neural network-driven behaviour
in systems such as Polyworld (Yaeger et al., 2010) and Geb (Channon, 2006).
However, it is restrictive to only consider the evolution of information pro-
cessing capabilities. Some of the most remarkable events in biological evolu-
tionary history have involved the evolution of new ways of interacting with the
environment via new sensors and effectors. The geochemical-physical medium in
which biological evolution unfolds offers an enormously rich source of complex
dynamics, across many different modalities of phenomena, that may potentially
be exploited by organisms to promote their survival and reproduction.
The need for complex environments for the production of interesting evo-
lution in artificial life systems has been recognised right back to the earliest
work in the area. Barricelli (1963) spoke in terms of adding “toy bricks” to the
environment to allow his digital organisms to evolve interesting behaviours.
In addition, the major transitions in evolution identified by Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry
(1995) involve changes in the organisation of individuals over evolutionary time.
Hence, open-ended artificial life systems should allow the organisation of indi-
vidual organisms to evolve as well.
Many issues arise when designing complex virtual environments in which or-
ganisms can evolve to access and exploit that complexity for their own ends.
These include questions such as whether the medium should have “messy” pro-
cesses with side effects, to allow for the serendipity often apparent in biological
evolution, and “matter of degree” rather than “all or nothing” processes to allow
for gradual evolution—described by Dennett (2013) as “sorta” evolution. Further
issues concern the origin of signs and signals, i.e. biosemiosis (Hoffmeyer, 2007),
and the representational relationship between organisms and environment such
that aspects such as new sensors and effectors can evolve without being “pro-
grammed in” by the designer (Taylor, 2004).
2.3 Individuals capable of producing more complex offspring
Beyond having a medium in which a wide variety of organism designs could pos-
sibly exist, in order for complex adaptations to evolve from simple progenitors, it
must be possible for an individual (or multiple individuals) to produce offspring
that are more complicated than their parent(s).
There are (at least) two ways in which this may occur:
– A single individual is capable of producing an offspring of greater complexity
than itself.
– Two or more individuals are jointly capable of producing an offspring of
greater complexity than any one of its parents.
The first solution is exactly the issue addressed by von Neumann (1966) in his
Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata. The fundamental requirement identified
by von Neumann is that the inherited information-bearing structures must be
involved in two distinct processes: (1) they are interpreted by the phenotype’s
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machinery as instructions to guide the construction of an individual, and (2)
they are copied uninterpreted from parent to offspring.
Seen in this general light, we can say that von Neumann’s requirements are
satisfied by biological cells (in 3D), by his proposed self-reproducing cellular
automata (in 2D), and by digital organisms such as those in Tierra (in 1D).
Note, however, that in the case of Tierra, the interpretation machinery is hard-
coded into an organism’s “virtual CPU” is is therefore not evolvable. In addition,
it is also desirable to allow for the evolution of other aspects of the evolutionary
process itself, such as allowing new forms of genetic transmission, evolution of
the organisation of the genome, evolution of mutation rates, etc. (Hindre´ et al.,
2012). Hence, issues of explicit versus implicit encoded, embeddedness in the
medium, etc., are also important concerns here (Taylor, 2013).
Biological examples of the second solution include horizontal gene transfer
(HGT) and symbiogenesis. These processes are much less well explored in the ar-
tificial life literature, despite their significance in biological evolution and the fact
that they provide a feasible complementary (or alternative) route to increased
complexity.
2.4 Mutational pathways to other viable individuals
For an open-ended evolutionary process, it is insufficient for individuals to have
the theoretical capacity for producing more complicated offspring. The fitness
landscape of the system must be such that there are often viable mutational
pathways open to individuals, leading to different individuals that are of roughly
the same fitness, or of higher fitness, than their parents. That is, there must often
be the opportunity for adaptive, or at least neutral, evolution. Otherwise, the
evolutionary process will often get stuck in local optima (dead ends) beyond
which no further change is possible.
While this has been understood for a long time—e.g. Rensch (1947) discussed
the need for “improvements allowing further improvement”—the task of under-
standing the requirements for a fitness landscape to have this property is now a
very active area of research.
A wide variety of work can be seen as contributing to this topic, including
Wagner (2011)’s work on evolutionary innovations and neutral networks, a wide
range of work on the evolution of evolution, e.g. (Hindre´ et al., 2012), evolvable
genotype–phenotype mappings, e.g. (Gerhart and Kirschner, 2007; Wagner and Altenberg,
1996; Wills, 2014), and major transitions, e.g. (Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry,
1995). Also relevant is work on understanding how complex structures can evolve
from simpler components in modular, hierarchical and nearly-decomposable sys-
tems, e.g. (Simon, 1962; Watson, 2006; Calcott, 2008), and related work on
semiosis in the origin of modular and loosely coupled systems, e.g. (Auletta et al.,
2008). Conrad (1990) has also argued that redundant, loosely coupled systems
can aid evolvability by creating “extradimensional bypasses” that prevent evo-
lution from getting stuck in local optima.
The importance of exaptation—where an existing phenotypic structure be-
comes selected for a different function—is well recognised in biology (Gould and Vrba,
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1982; Whitacre, 2010). A challenge for achieving open-ended evolution in arti-
ficial systems is to work with structures that potentially have multi-functional
properties, perhaps in different domains of interaction (Taylor, 2013).
All of the topics mentioned here (and many others too) provide us with ideas
of how to create artificial evolutionary systems in which individuals have room
to move as they explore the evolutionary landscape.
2.5 Drive for continued evolution
Even with the first four requirements in place, a continued drive is required to
force the system to explore new states.
To create any drive in the system at all, selection pressure must exist. In gen-
eral, this can be brought about by competition for some kind of limited resource
(which may be matter, energy, space), or through environmental conditions, etc.
Selection creates an adaptive landscape in which some variations of organism
are favoured over others.
In order to achieve continued drive, the individuals must experience a chang-
ing adaptive landscape (Waddington, 1969). In biological populations this is
brought about by other individuals being part of the ecological environment—
those individuals are also evolving, and can alter the fitness landscape by di-
rect interaction, e.g. co-evolution (Thompson, 1994), or indirectly through their
actions, e.g. ecosystem engineering (Jones et al., 1997) and niche construction
(Odling-Smee et al., 2003). Changes can also come about through (passive or
active) diffusion of species to new environments (e.g. migration).
A changing adaptive landscape also has bearing on the available mutational
pathways of the system (Section 2.4), as it will have consequences for what set
of mutational neighbours of an individual are now viable.6
Some kinds of drive will push the system towards higher complexity (e.g. co-
evolutionary arms races), whereas others will lead to change but not necessarily
higher complexity. Whether the latter counts as “open-ended evolution” depends
on one’s definition.
Many artificial evolutionary systems lack the rich connectedness of individu-
als brought about by ecological interactions, niche construction, etc., and this is
no doubt part of the explanation of why open-endedness remains elusive in those
systems (Taylor, 2013). In addition, if we wish to engineer artificial evolutionary
systems aimed at solving particular problems, an important question is how to
appropriately introduce some kind of extrinsic selection (e.g. fitness function),
rather than relying on purely intrinsic natural selection, while still retaining an
effective drive at each step of the process.
3 Conclusion
While it is clear that the requirements for open-ended evolution extend far be-
yond the basic Darwinian demands of variation, differential reproduction and
6 Indeed, this process has been observed experimentally in studies of virus–bacteria
coevolution (Meyer et al., 2012; Thompson, 2012).
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inheritance, I have argued that these additional ideas can be seen as aspects
of five basic requirements: (1) robustly reproductive individuals, (2) a medium
allowing the possible existence of a practically unlimited diversity of individuals
and interactions, (3) individuals capable of producing more complex offspring,
(4) mutational pathways to other viable individuals, and (5) drive for continued
evolution.
While advances in the evolutionary potential of artificial systems can come
about by careful consideration of the details of all of the topics and theories
discussed, it is useful to consider these five basic features as the foundation
upon which open-ended evolution can be achieved.
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